



## ORIGINAL RESEARCH PAPER

### “The Intentional Fallacy”, itself a Fallacy: a Critique of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “The Intentional Fallacy”

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This research aims to highlight the falsities of William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley’s article “*The Intentional Fallacy*” (1946). These two New Critics believe that the intention of the author should not be considered when judging the text because the intention of the author is neither available nor desirable. The present research questions two of their claims: that the intention is something separate from the textual meaning and that the authorial intention is private and biographical while the poem is public. To refute their claims, the research employs E.D. Hirsch’s concept of verbal meaning. Verbal meaning is simply a special kind of intentional object which he considers to be synonymous with textual meaning. The study goes beyond Hirsch’s ideas and claims that from the moment the author transfers his intention, through language, to the text, it is no longer an intention but the object. Language, according to the New Critics is a proper and reliable medium, so when Wimsatt and Beardsley question the authorial intention, they are actually questioning the very notion of language. Their second claim, that is the private nature of the author’s intention, will be rejected by borrowing T.S. Eliot’s analogy of the poet to a catalyst. Eliot shows that the poet does not include his/her personality traits in the poem. The achievement of this study is a new view toward the authorial intention, a view which is not based on personal and biographical factors but on verbal factors.

**Keywords:** Intentional Fallacy, Authorial Intention, New Criticism, Verbal meaning, Language.

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## Introduction

“In every work regard the writer’s end, /Since none can compass more than they intend”

Alexander Pope, *An Essay on Criticism* (1711)

In 1946 William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley co-authored the essay “The Intentional Fallacy” within which they argued that the intention of the author is neither available nor desirable. Such a remark for two New Critics is not surprising at all. New Criticism, which started in the 1940s, came to reject all the historical and biographical readings of literary texts. The advocates of the historical approach believed that to study only the text and not its author, his/her psyche and environment would lead to an incomplete analysis. One of the famous voices of historical approach was Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (1828-1893) who in his *The History of English Literature* (1871) while comparing the text to a fossil shell, asserted that in order to understand a literary text, we must examine all the environmental causes that are involved in its creation. He specifies the four categories of race, milieu, moment and dominant faculty as the necessary factors for examining a literary text. Otherwise, he believed, we could not appreciate the text fully. (cf. Taine 1871, 17-18) Against this view emerged New Criticism, with its emphasis on the ontological status of the work of art which led them to undertake a textual analysis. New Critics considered the literary text as an autotelic artifact that had a one and only meaning within itself. They treated the text as an object which could be dissected into smaller parts and which had an organic unity, meaning that all parts were interrelated and supported the text’s central idea.

Many critics came to speak for new criticism’s tenets, each of them contributing in a way to the movement’s principles. But before the emergence of New Criticism, there were two British literary figures who with their emphasis on the text in a way initiated the New Critical movement: T.S. Eliot and I.A. Richards. T.S. Eliot in his essay “Hamlet and his problems” (1920) introduced the concept of objective correlative:

“The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula for that particular emotion; such that, when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.”

Such a view refuted the claim of the Romantic school of poetry who believed that the artist’s emotions, attitudes and personal visions were depicted in the work he/she created. The Objective correlative, thus, provides the ground for an impersonal theory of the creation of emotions in poetry.

The other figure laying the foundation for New Criticism was I. A Richards, who in his *Practical Criticism* called for a close reading of the text which came to be synonymous with New Criticism. He gave his students some poems which lacked

any information regarding the name of the poet and the time they were written. Some years later he reported the analyses of the results of his investigations in his book *Practical Criticism* (1929). In it, he explains that "only through anonymity could complete liberty to express their genuine opinions be secured for the writers." (3) The goal of his work was to urge students to focus on the words on the page, rather than relying on preconceived or received beliefs about a text. In Richards' idea this kind of close analysis of anonymous poems was ultimately intended to have psychological benefits for the students: by responding to all the currents of emotion and meaning in the poems and passages of prose which they read, the students were to achieve what Richards called an organized response (cf. Richards 1929, 260). In other words, they would clarify the various currents of thought in the poem and achieve a corresponding clarification of their own emotions.

John Crew Ransom, one of the leading figures of New Criticism, insisted on "technical studies of poetry" (1937, 600) by focusing on metrics and tropes thereby securing the poem from "aesthetic distance" and removing it from history. He strongly believed that historical study prevents students from acquiring the skills needed for them to understand technical effects. (cf. Ransom 1937)

Cleanth Brooks in his "The Formalistic Critics" states that the study of literary works does not deal with the author, the reader or the historical context, but with the specific text. (cf. Brooks 1951, 75).

So what Wimsatt and Beardsley proposed as the "The Intentional Fallacy" was in line with the principles of this newly shaped movement and its theorists. In it, they opposed the assumption that the intention of the author for a work of art was equal to the meaning and value of the work. These two argued that once a work of art is published, it has an objective status and its meanings belong to the reading public. They also claim that the intention and design of the author is neither available nor desirable.

The present study aims to address two of their claims in "The Intentional Fallacy": first that the authorial intention is something separate from the work of art and second that the author expresses private emotions and feelings within the text. Therefore the research questions are the followings:

1. Why isn't the intention of the author separate from the text?
2. Why doesn't the author include his/her subjective stance in the text?

By answering the above-mentioned questions, the present research aims to refute Wimsatt and Beardsley's claim in "The Intentional Fallacy" and offer a new perspective regarding the authorial intention.

### **Literature Review**

In this part, the study offers a review of the works that have been done on the scope of this research which directly or indirectly have influenced the present study.

One of the first reactions against Wimsatt and Beardsley's "The Intentional Fallacy" is E.D. Hirsch's the "Objective Interpretation" (1960) within which he elaborates on the concept of verbal meaning as the equivalent of the intention of the author. His remarks are a great help to the present study. Throughout this article, Hirsch argues that the permanent and the only meaning of a text is what the author means. By intention, he does not mean nonverbal ones, but the verbal meaning of a text. He also makes use of Saussure's langue and parole in order to refute Wimsatt and Beardsley's claim regarding the public nature of a work of art. In spite of all these insightful comments, Hirsch does not refer to the nature of language according to the New Critics. For the New Critics language is a reliable medium, while Wimsatt and Beardsley by rejecting the intention of the author unknowingly question the reliability of the author's medium which is language.

Colin Lyas in his "Personal Qualities and the Intentional Fallacy" published in 1972 argued that Wimsatt and Beardsley in "The intentional Fallacy" have not distinguished between an attack on the intention of the author in *evaluating* the work of art or *interpreting* it. (195). Within the same article Lyas argues that intentions should not be considered as private mental events detached from verbal behavior. Though Lyas's claim is in line with the tenets of this research, he has not distinguished between an authorial intention and a flesh and blood author. This is what we are going to do in this study.

Lindong Zhang is another researcher who has addressed the "The Intentional Fallacy" in his "Intentional Fallacy Reconsidered" (2012). In it Zhang gives a very illuminating definition of 'intention' and 'extension' but as a whole Zhang's methodology is deconstructive which is not the focus of the present study.

### Methodology

This research aims to criticize Wimsatt and Beardsley's concept of "intentional fallacy" by putting doubt on two of their claims in their article. The first claim to be refuted in this study is that they believe the of intention of the author is something separate from the text. This article by employing E.D. Hirsch's conception of verbal meaning accomplishes this task. By considering the verbal meaning as that aspect of the author's intention which under linguistic conventions may be shared by all, this study highlights how the intention of the author is inseparable from the words in a text.

Wimsatt and Beardsley's other claim regarding the private nature of the authorial intention will be rejected by T.S Eliot's comparison between an author and a catalyst. Eliot in his "Tradition and the Individual Talent" argues that just the same as the catalyst which remains unaffected and neutral in a chemical process, the poet also remains neutral and does not include his/her own personal emotions within the text.

By making use of these concepts as the methodology of the research, the present study tries to liberate the author from its biographical and historical context and help the readers to regard the author as a verbal authority rather than a person in history. Further, the study claims that if we consider language as a reliable medium, as New Critics do, we cannot accept that a gap exists between the authorial intention and the text.

### Results and Discussion

Prior to starting our discussion about the "The Intentional Fallacy" and its meaning, it's better to clarify the very concept of authorial intention. While many critics associate the author's intention with historical, biographical and personal information of the author and its milieu, this article has no such aims. The author's intention should not be confused with his/her biographical or historical background. Though this background information may help us to have a better understanding of the work of art, they are not necessarily in line with the author's intention. Many critics have come to banish authors just because, they believe, the author of a text is synonymous with the biographical information and personal traits. Such a view not only underestimates the role of the author, but also questions the authority of the text. This study claims that the relation between the author and his/her text is not of the kind to be separated. From the moment the author transfers the idea by the use of language to the text, it is part of the text. In other words, it is a combination which cannot be separated. This research employs E.D Hirsch's concept of intention. Hirsch, by borrowing Edmund Husserl's concept of "intentional object", comes to the point that the speaker's intention has two aspects: one of them is nonverbal, which Husserl calls "experience" and one of them is verbal which he calls "content". Hirsch continues Husserl's thoughts by claiming that "[...] the general term for all intentional objects is meaning. Verbal meaning is simply a special kind of intentional object, and like any other one, it remains self-identical over against the many different acts which 'intend' it." (1960, 467). One of the features of verbal meaning is its supra-personal aspect. It cannot be an intentional object just for one person, but for many and even for all persons. Hirsch goes on to define verbal meaning as "that aspect of a speaker's "intention" which, under linguistic conventions, may be shared by others." (Hirsch 1960) So we come to the point that the things which are not shared in this sense cannot belong to the verbal meaning.

So what this research means by authorial intention is the verbal meaning. The goal of each author, during the process of creating a work of art is to convey his/her verbal meaning to the reader through the use of language. But what Hirsch does not take into account is the reliable nature of language according to the New Critics. By using a reliable medium, the author is able to transform his intentions to the text. Therefore, there is no gap between the authorial intention and the text.

The author acts as the governor of the text; he/she is authorized to write. Since his/her medium is language, the author has the right to play with the words and choose the one he/she desires the most. He/she is the one in charge of the events and consequences, for the things said as well as for the things not said, for conveying a moral lesson or simply entertaining an enthusiastic audience. His role is undeniable as Cleanth Brooks himself a New Critic admits:

The formalist critic knows as well as anyone that poems and plays and novels are written by men- that they do not somehow happen and that they are written as expressions of particular personalities and are written from all sorts of motives- for money, from a desire to express oneself, for the sake of a cause, etc. But the formalist critic is concerned primarily with the work itself. Speculation on the mental processes of the author takes the critic away from the work into biography and psychology. There is no reason, of course, why he should not turn away into biography and psychology. Such explorations are very much worth making. But they should not be confused with an account of the work. Such studies describe the process of composition, not the structure of the thing composed, and they may be performed quite as validly for the poor work as for the good one. (1951, 74)

This remark indicates that while Brooks acknowledges the presence of the author, he refuses to consider his/her intention because he believes it will take the critic away from the work into biography and psychology. As we said previously, in this article, we are not considering the authorial intention as his/her biographical information. Whatever Robert Browning's biographical information is, his intention for creating the persona of "My Last Duchess" remains untouched. Whether the poet was mad or whether he was referring to his own or an acquaintance's experience is not the concern of the present study. That is the job of the historical critics. For understating the author's intention, one does not need to delve into his/her past and discover the biographical and historical information. What one needs is to follow his/her medium, which is language. Why? Because, as we discussed above, what we mean by intention is the verbal meaning.

Before moving any further, we would like to distinguish between three terms which are more often than not, mistakenly considered to be one. On the one hand, we have the New Critics who believe the text has just one correct interpretation; on the other hand, we have the reader-oriented critics who argue for as many meanings as there are readers. There is another group of critics who claim that the meaning of the text, changes from one historical period to the other. These opposing views are not based on differences of ideas, but on the confusion over the terms. "Meaning", "interpretation" and "significance" are three distinct terms. A text can only have one meaning while it can have a plurality of interpretations. "Meaning" is permanent and objective, whereas "interpretation" is changing and subjective. Readers may have their own interpretations of a text which may not be in line with the intention of the author. But as long as it is an interpretation, there is nothing wrong about it; because

interpretation is quite subjective. But when we enter the realm of meaning, we cannot arrive at a plurality of meanings. That is why we always say "this is my interpretation and that's yours." But we never say "this is my meaning and that's yours."

Regarding the third confusion, we can claim that this is not the "meaning" which changes from one historical period to the other; it's the "significance" of the text. Here "significance" is synonymous with the value of a certain text. E.D Hirsch in his "Objective Interpretation" clearly distinguished between textual meaning and its significance. He points out that textual meaning is permanent while significance is variable. 'Significance' changes due to the shifts in historical, social and personal conditions. (1960, 464) When Hans Robert Jauss claims that meaning changes from one historical era to the other, he has "significance" in mind and not the meaning. The reason why neoclassical poetry lost its popularity in the Romantic period was because its significance due to some shifts in ideas changed. If these changes had happened in the realm of meaning, then there would be no reason for the Romantics to reject Alexander Pope's poetry; because they would simply adjust the poem to their own ideas and principles. As Hirsch indicates "the significance of textual meaning has no foundation and no objectivity unless the meaning is unchanging." (Hirsch 1960, 465) In other words, changes in the significance of texts presuppose the fixity in meaning. And that is the criteria for distinguishing a masterpiece from an ordinary work. If the significance of a good work of art survived different historical periods, it can be considered a masterpiece. A good example is the works of Shakespeare. But if the significance of a good work of art changed, it cannot have the status of a masterpiece. The reverse is also the case. If significance and value of a bad work of art changed from one period to another and remained the same, that work could also be considered a masterpiece.

In this article, we are concerned with meaning or better to say 'verbal meaning' and not interpretation or significance; because our focus is neither on the reader nor on the changes in historical periods but on the authorial intention and the text. Now that we have achieved a better grasp of "meaning", "interpretation" and "significance" as well as authorial intention, it's time to move into "The Intentional Fallacy" and its tenets.

In the middle of the twentieth century, when the New Critical approach was gradually dominating the academic atmospheres came William K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley with their essay "The Intentional Fallacy" (1946). In it, they opposed the assumption that the original creator's intention for a work of art was equal to the meaning and value of the work. These two argued that once a work of art is published, it has an objective status and its meanings belong to the reading public. Therefore, any surmise about the author's intention should be abandoned. Wimsatt and Beardsley argued that the text is:



[...] Detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or control it. The text is written using language which is a possession of the public and is about issues which can be easily related to by human beings who are objects of public knowledge. (1946, 470)

They go on further to distinguish between internal (public) and external (private) evidences for judging the meaning of a poem. According to them the internal evidences are discovered through semantic and syntax of a poem. The external evidences, they argue, are not part of a work's linguistic fact. They contain revelations about how and why the poet wrote the poem. They offer an intermediate kind which discusses the character of the author or the semi-private meaning of words. The last two, they claim, shade into one another and are not proper means for judging the meaning of a poem. (cf. Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946, 477-78).

From the time Wimsatt and Beardsley have published "The Intentional Fallacy" many books of glossaries have tried to define the term. M.H Abrams in his *A Glossary of Literary Terms* defines the term as: "the error of interpreting and evaluating a literary work by reference to evidence, outside the text itself, for the intention—the design and purposes—of its author." (1999, 126).

*A Handbook of literature* defines it as: "in contemporary criticism, a term used to describe the error of judging the success and the meaning of a work of art by the author's expressed or ostensible intention in producing it." (Holman 1980, 231)

*The Dictionary of Literary terms* defines it as: "The error of criticizing and judging a work of literature by attempting to assess what the writer's intention was and whether or not he has fulfilled it rather than concentrating on the work itself" (Cuddon 2012, 330).

*The Harper Handbook to Literature* defines it as: "the idea that the meaning of a work can be explained by considering the author's intention, a fallacy according to the New Criticism." (Frye et al 1997, 243)

In spite of all these simple and lucid definitions, still there are some ambiguities regarding the "intentional fallacy". Their chief claim within their article is the very embodiment of confusion: "The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art." (1946, 468).

There are at least two ambiguities within this sentence. One of these them is what Colin Lyas objected in his "Personal Qualities and the Intentional Fallacy" (1972). Lyas argues that though Wimsatt and Beardsley clearly state that the intention of the author is neither available nor desirable for *judging* (emphasis mine) the success of a work of art, as the article proceeds they change their stance and link this claim to the interpretation of a work of art rather than judging it. (cf. Lyas 1972, 195) Though interpretation is necessary for judging the success of a work, they are two different concepts and fall into different levels.



The other confusion arises from the first part of the sentence. This sentence would be correct if by intention, we meant the "motives" of the author. As we said before, the intention of the speaker has two aspects, verbal and nonverbal. Wimsatt and Beardsley have not distinguished between these two aspects. Motives fall within the category of nonverbal intention. A writer may have a dozen of motives when writing a text. Motives like making money, gaining someone's attention, being famous etc.... The motives of the author are not available to us, and even if they are available, they are not a help in figuring out the meaning of the text. The New Critics are not concerned with the 'why': why did the author write such a work? Why did he choose this word and not that word? What they are concerned with is the 'what': what is the meaning of this word? What is the relation of this word to the whole text and its theme? Or in Wimsatt and Beardsley's own term they are concerned with internal evidence rather than external and intermediate evidence. It should be noted that this essay is also concerned with what they claim to be the internal evidence like the semantics and syntax of a poem and not the materials which are not part of linguistic fact. As we said before, by intention, we mean the verbal meaning of a text declared by its author. We are not here to repudiate the New Critical approach and say that a close reading of a text and paying considerable attention to the intrinsic factors is wrong. We just maintain that Wimsatt and Beardsley's claim in "The Intentional Fallacy" is itself a fallacy. Why is it a fallacy? Because Wimsatt and Beardsley by questioning the authorial intention are actually questioning the author's medium, which is language. For the New Critics language is a proper tool for conveying and deciphering the meaning. So when Wimsatt and Beardsley claim that to judge a work of art based on authorial intention is a fallacy, it means that they are claiming that language is not a proper tool for conveying the meaning of an authorial agency to the text. Though this claim stands true, according to the critics who work in the field of deconstruction, in the time of these two New Critics not only such a claim did not exist but also discredited the New Critics' claim. For New Critics, as opposed to the deconstructionalists neither the language is slippery nor is the text without organic unity. So how can they claim that the author's intention which is being transformed to the text by the use of language is not desirable?

Part of their problem is that they consider the authorial intention as something external to the text, something which could be taken aside. The other part of their problem is that they regard the author's intention as something personal. And everything personal, according to the New Critics should be abandoned.

As far as the first problem is considered, this research claims that the verbal meaning of the author and the meaning of the text are one and the same. As long as we consider the language as a proper medium for transferring information, we cannot distinguish between an author's intention for conveying a message and its reflection in the text. When the intention with the use of language is transferred to

the text, it is no longer the intention but the object. What Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels argue in their well-known article "Against Theory" (1982) is in line with the above-mentioned claim:

The mistake made by theorists has been to imagine the possibility or desirability of moving from one term (the author's intended meaning) to a second term (the text's meaning), when actually the two terms are the same. One can neither succeed nor fail in deriving one term from the other, since to have one is already to have them both. (724)

The bases of Wimsatt and Beardsley's claim stand on a gap between the authorial intention and the meaning of the text, while such a gap does not exist. What is meant by the authorial intention is not something external to the text, but these two critics consistently identifies it with the author/poet's biographical background and his/her personal emotions and feelings.

Regarding their claim about the author's intention as something personal and text as something public, this study employs the ideas of a literary critic who in a way initiated New Criticism. Long before the publication of Wimsatt and Beardsley's "The Intentional Fallacy", T.S Eliot had already responded to their article. Eliot in his "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1921) distinguished between a mature and immature poet. He says they are not different in matters of personality, or being more interesting or having more to say but by "being a more finely perfected medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at liberty to enter into new combinations." (48). Eliot continues by comparing the mature poet to a catalyst. Just the same as the catalyst which during a chemical process remains neutral and unchanged, the mind of the mature poet remains unaffected: "the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material." (Eliot 1921) This way, Eliot points out, it is not the personality traits of the poet that forms the poem but the experiences of the author's personality which are the same as all of our experiences. Eliot rather than questioning the authorial intention, by the use of an analogy dismissed the inclusion of any personal feelings and emotions on the part of the author.

E.D Hirsch, who is one of the leading advocates of the authorial intention, in his "Objective Interpretation" attack's this notion of "The Intentional Fallacy" about the text, being public, means what the speech community takes it to mean. Hirsch by employing Ferdinand de Saussure's terminology elucidates how shaky Wimsatt and Beardsley's claim on this matter is:

It implies that the meaning represented by the text is not the *parole* of an author, but rather the *parole* of the speech community. But since only individuals utter *paroles*, a *parole* of the speech community is a nonexistent, or what the Germans call an *Unding*. A text can represent only the *parole* of a speaker or author, which is another way of saying that a meaner. (1960, 474)

In line with this claim, Hirsch argues that in no way is the subjective stance of the author part of the verbal meaning:

In no sense does the text represent the author's subjective stance: the interpreter simply adopts a stance in order to make sense of the text, and, if he is self-critical, he tries to verify his interpretation by showing his adopted stance to be, in all probability, the author's. (Hirsch 1960, 478)

What we grasp from the above-mentioned claims are that first, the meaning of the text is the individual utterance or parole of the author and not that of the public and second, that the text does not represent the author's subjective stance, meaning that the subjectivity of the author has nothing to do with his intention or verbal meaning. Here, we should distinguish between the speaking subject and the subjectivity of the author as an actual person in history. We can say it is that part of the author which determines the verbal meaning. In interpreting a text, the author's private feelings and experiences should not be considered. The only aspect of subjectivity to be considered is that which determines the verbal meaning.

Wimsatt and Beardsley, somewhere in their article claim that the poem is neither the critic's own nor the author's. "It belongs to the public." (1946, 470). First and foremost, this view of looking at the poem as an object which could be possessed is totally New Critical. Secondly, if a poem does not belong to the critic and author, then it should neither belong to the public. The author as the creator of the text, the critic as the judge of the text and the public as the readers of the text are all in their own ways involved in the process of meaning formation. To acknowledge the reader's interaction with the text and not to acknowledge the author's intention is like to credit the consumer and discredit the producer.

So who determines what a literary work means, its author, its reader or the text itself? This has been one of the most controvertible issues in literature. Many critics believe that the meaning rests only and only in the mind of the author. Reader-oriented critics assert that meaning resides in the transaction between the text and the reader. Also, they claim that we have as many meanings as we have readers. As we discussed, the New Critics believe that in order to find the meaning of a text we should only engage ourselves with intrinsic factor of a text like language and tropes, not the extrinsic factors such as the biographical information of the historical period within which the author of the text lives in. As we said before, what the reader-oriented critics offer is just the readers' own interpretations and not necessarily the meaning of a text. Readers are of a large community and it is probable that many of them due to lack of knowledge or skill misinterpret the meaning or each bring to the text their own experiences, memories or biases. This way of reading the text cannot reach to the textual meaning. It can only provide a variety of interpretations. As Martin Heidegger says, "it is language that first brings man about, bring him into existence" (1950, 1123) not the other way around. So if we consider language as the text and consciousness as the reader, we conclude that it is not the reader who calls

the text into being; it is the text that shapes the reader. By considering the language as a reliable medium we can infer that this is the verbal meaning or the intention of the author that shapes meaning and not the flesh and blood author who has a historical and biographical background.

### Conclusion

This research attempted to show that Wimsatt and Beardsley's claim in their famous article "The Intentional Fallacy" is itself a fallacy. These two critics by considering the intention of the author as something extrinsic have identified it with the author's historical and biographical background. This study poses two research questions by which it highlights the falsities of Wimsatt and Beardsley's article "The Intentional Fallacy". Through the study, we refute Wimsatt and Beardsley's two chief claims: the first one is that they draw a line between the authorial intention and the text, considering the former as an external factor. By employing E.D. Hirsch's findings the research indicates that the intention has two aspects: one is nonverbal, the other verbal. What we are concerned with in the discussion of this study is the verbal aspect of the intention. Therefore, what we mean by the authorial intention is the verbal meaning of the text which has been communicated through language. From this point of view, it is not possible to draw a line between the intention of the author and the meaning of the text. Now the author's idea has a verbal aspect which has been transferred to the text through language. The chief claim of the research is that since the New Critics consider language a verified tool for communicating and deciphering meaning, then to claim that there is a gap between the author's verbal meaning and the textual meaning is to question the reliability of the language.

Their second claim is that they believe the author reflects his/her personal and private emotions in the text. To refute this claim, we made use of T.S Eliot's analogy between the poet and a catalyst. Eliot highlights the neutrality of a mature poet who like a catalyst in a chemical process remains unchanged.

As a result, this study tried to look at the authorial intention in a new perspective, seeing it not as something external but something verbal and linguistic which has been transferred to the text with the help of a reliable language. Our stance in this research is not to repudiate the New Critical approach or to put more emphasis on the author. We just tried to liberate the authorial intention from external concepts like historical, biographical and personal factors. We believe that as long as language is considered to be a reliable medium, the intention of the author could be in line with textual meaning. But from a poststructuralist point of view, such a claim can be refuted and thus requires further research.

Anyway, as far as New Criticism is concerned, the intention of the author is both available and desirable.

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## سرکوب معنی در رمان بازمانده روز کازو ایشیگرو: مغالطه قصدی خودش یک مغالطه است: نقدی بر مقاله «مغالطه قصدی» ویمست و بیردزلی

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این تحقیق در تلاش است تا اشتباهات مقاله «مغالطه قصدی» از ویمست و بیردزلی را بررسی کند. این دو منتقد نقد نویی بر این باورند که قصد نویسنده نباید هنگام ارزیابی متن در نظر گرفته شود، چون قصد نویسنده نه موجود است و نه مطلوب. این تحقیق دو مورد از ادعاهای این دو تن را زیر سؤال می‌برد: اول اینکه قصد نویسنده مجزا از معنای متنی است و دوم اینکه قصد نویسنده عاملی شخصی و بیوگرافیکی است در حالی که شعر عمومی است. این مقاله برای رد کردن ادعای آن‌ها از مفهوم معنای زبانی ای. دی هیرش استفاده می‌کند. معنای زبانی نوعی از شی قصدی است که هیرش آن را هم معنی با معنای متنی می‌داند. این مطالعه از گفته‌های هیرش فراتر می‌رود و ادعا می‌کند که از لحظه‌ای که نویسنده قصدش را از طریق زبان به متن منتقل می‌کند، دیگر با قصد مواجه نیستیم بلکه با شی مواجهیم. زبان طبق نظر منتقدان نقد نو ابزاری مناسب و قابل اعتماد است، بنابراین وقتی ویمست و بیردزلی قصد نویسنده را زیر سؤال می‌برند، در واقع مفهوم زبان را زیر سؤال می‌برند. دومین ادعای آن‌ها یعنی ماهیت شخصی قصد نویسنده با استفاده از عقیده تی.اس الیوت در مورد مقایسه شاعر و کاتالیزگر رد می‌شود. الیوت معتقد است که شاعر خصوصیات شخصیتی خود را وارد شعر نمی‌کند. این مطالعه بینش ما را نسبت به قصد نویسنده تغییر می‌دهد و به ما کمک می‌کند تا دریابیم که قصد نویسنده نه تنها عاملی شخصی و بیوگرافیکی نیست بلکه عاملی از عوامل زبانی است.

واژه‌های کلیدی: مغالطه قصدی، قصد نویسنده، نقد نو، معنای زبانی، زبان.

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